@article{aup:/content/journals/10.5117/ANTW2016.1.NICK, author = "Nickel, Philip J.", title = "Vrijheid door scepticisme", journal= "Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte", year = "2016", volume = "108", number = "1", pages = "19-36", doi = "https://doi.org/10.5117/ANTW2016.1.NICK", url = "https://www.aup-online.com/content/journals/10.5117/ANTW2016.1.NICK", publisher = "Amsterdam University Press", issn = "2352-1244", type = "Journal Article", keywords = "skepticism", keywords = "doxastic voluntarism", keywords = "epistemic permissivism", keywords = "freedom", keywords = "suspension of judgment", abstract = "Abstract Freedom Through Skepticism In this paper, I consider a form of skepticism that has a permissive conclusion, according to which we are rationally permitted to suspend judgment in an area, or to have beliefs in that area. I argue that such a form of skepticism is resistant to some traditional strategies of refutation. It also carries a benefit, namely that it increases voluntary control over doxastic states by introducing options, and therefore greater freedom, into the realm of belief. I argue that intellectual preferences and dispositions provide decisive reasons that can settle our doxastic states in such cases.", }