Voor rede vatbaar: hoe goed zijn mensen in het redeneren met argumenten? | Amsterdam University Press Journals Online
2004
Volume 43, Issue 1
  • ISSN: 1573-9775
  • E-ISSN: 2352-1236

Abstract

Abstract

A phenomenon that has become clearer through social media is that people often gather with like-minded others to strengthen their opinions. In such circumstances, people do not respond in a reasonable way to the arguments of others or even completely ignore the opinions of those who think differently. But what does it mean to reason reasonably with arguments? What exactly can we expect from people? And how good are we at reasoning with arguments? Studies have shown that people can be sensitive to norms for reasonable arguments. Standpoints are more likely to be accepted if they are supported by arguments that meet normative standards. Whereas people may thus be open to reason, dealing with norms can be culture dependent. This finding creates a fascinating field of tension between absolute norms and the relativity of cultures.

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  • Article Type: Research Article
Keyword(s): argument quality; cultural differences; norms; reasoning
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