2004
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Volume 51, Issue 1
  • ISSN: 0165-4322
  • E-ISSN: 3050-9947

Abstract

Abstract

Democracy’s strength – indeterminacy – also turns out to be its weakness. This indeterminacy can be a breeding ground for either fear or frivolity. On the one hand, this indeterminacy can cause man to desire a form of assurance; a power, mass or other external abstraction to which he can adhere and in which he can anonymously merge. On the other hand, this indeterminacy can cause man to seize freedom (which is inherent in this indeterminacy), but to approach this freedom very light-minded. This man avoids the responsibility that comes with realizing that freedom and prefers to vegetate in the infinite, free nothingness. Both types of man, with their disregard for democratic values, contribute to a certain deterioration of democracy. Nevertheless, the indeterminacy of democracy also forms a climate in which the true democrat can emerge. In order to become a true democrat, however, a mastery of true irony is important. The true ironist knows how to truly relate to the democracy, to the democratic principles, values and institutions and to others, which is essential for true democracy. That is where true democracy begins, with the authentic individual who dares to take responsibility for freedom and to give substance to indeterminacy.

© Karel Lucas Arnoldus Wijdeveld
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2025-04-01
2025-06-17
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Keyword(s): democracy; freedom; indeterminacy; irony; responsibility
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