2004
Volume 52, Issue 1
  • ISSN: 0165-4322
  • E-ISSN: 3050-9947

Abstract

Abstract

Epistemic conservatism is the idea that a person is epistemically justified to maintain every belief they in fact hold, unless there is a defeater for that belief. This theory challenges the idea that beliefs can only be reasonably or justifiably held if they are supported by available evidence. The plausibility of epistemic conservatism becomes clear once we realise that if we generally trust the whole of our cognitive faculties and our ability to recognize defeaters, then we should also accord the products of the whole of our cognitive faculties – beliefs – a positive epistemic status such as justification.

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  • Article Type: Research Article
Keyword(s): common sense; epistemic justification; evidence; evidentialism; rational beliefs
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