Dual or single gauge? Govert den Hartogh’s ‘dual-track’ assisted death | Amsterdam University Press Journals Online
2004
Volume 45, Issue 1
  • ISSN: 0167-2444
  • E-ISSN: 2949-8651

Abstract

Abstract

In (2023), Govert den Hartogh offers a ‘dual-track’ model for assisted death. According to Den Hartogh’s model, mere access to lethal drugs would be lawful on the basis of an autonomous decision (Track 1), while “full-blown physicianassisted death” (provision of lethal means under professional supervision and care) would be lawful in the presence of an autonomous decision and satisfaction of further conditions instantiating values including dignity and well-being (Track 2). I offer a critical reading of Den Hartogh’s argument in respect of the nature and justification of Track 1. I argue that permitting mere access to lethal medication may be both “lifting a blockade” (as Den Hartogh argues) and assisting an individual to die (as he denies). This conclusion about the of Track 1 opens the question of the sufficiency of Den Hartogh’s claim that autonomy is its sole normative ground. A revised account of the for Track 1 is possible, however. I argue that Track 1 assistance may be permissible on the same grounds as Den Hartogh provides for Track 2: autonomy in conjunction with other values (albeit in a different mix). Rather than conceive of Den Hartogh’s model for assisted death as ‘dual-track’, dual gauge, we might rather consider mere access to lethal drugs and full-blown physician assisted death as two services on a single normative gauge.

Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.5117/FEP2024.1.005.BLAC
2024-04-01
2024-05-24
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

References

  1. Atkins, K., “Autonomy and the Subjective Character of Experience,”Journal of Applied Philosophy17 (2000) 1, 71-79.
    [Google Scholar]
  2. Black, I., “Refusing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment and the ECHR,”Oxford Journal of Legal Studies38 (2018) 2, 299-327.
    [Google Scholar]
  3. Black, I., “A Pro Tanto Moral Case for Assisted Death” in Westwood, S. (Ed.), Regulating the end of life: death rights. London: Routledge2021.
    [Google Scholar]
  4. Dworkin, G., The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
    [Google Scholar]
  5. Feinberg, J., Harm to Self. New York: Oxford University Press1986.
    [Google Scholar]
  6. Foot, P., “Euthanasia,”Philosophy & Public Affairs6 (1977) 2, 85-112.
    [Google Scholar]
  7. Den Hartogh, G., What Kind of Death. The Ethics of Determining One’s Own Death. New York: Routledge, 2023.
    [Google Scholar]
  8. Hurka, T., “Why Value Autonomy?,”Social Theory and Practice13 (1987) 3, 361-382.
    [Google Scholar]
  9. Kamm, F.M., “Physician-Assisted Suicide, the Doctrine of Double Effect, and the Ground of Value,”Ethics109 (1999) 3, 586-605.
    [Google Scholar]
  10. Mackenzie, C., “Relational Autonomy, Normative Authority and Perfectionism,”Journal of Social Philosophy39 (2008) 4, 512-533.
    [Google Scholar]
  11. Nagel, T., “Personal Rights and Public Space,”Philosophy & Public Affairs24 (1995) 2, 83-107.
    [Google Scholar]
  12. Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
    [Google Scholar]
  13. Raz, J., “Death in Our Life,”Journal of Applied Philosophy30 (2013) 1, 1-11.
    [Google Scholar]
  14. Richardson, H.S., “Specifying Norms as a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical Problems,”Philosophy and Public Affairs19 (1990) 4, 279-310.
    [Google Scholar]
  15. Sumner, L., Assisted Death: A Study in Ethics andLlaw. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
    [Google Scholar]
  16. Wedgwood, R., “Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action,”Philosophical Issues19 (2009), 321-342.
    [Google Scholar]
http://instance.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.5117/FEP2024.1.005.BLAC
Loading
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error