Volume 40, Issue 1
  • ISSN: 2542-6583
  • E-ISSN: 2590-3268



In the light of Hare’s argument in his latest book on we might deal with two fundamental questions concerning normative reasoning: (1) What precisely is the content of a utilitarian criterion of moral rightness, i.e. what does it mean to say of an action that it results in an ‘equal amount of happiness’ or in ‘more happiness’ than another action? (2) How should a utilitarian criterion be used in a process of deliberation, i.e. in choosing between alternative courses of action, what procedure should we follow to reach a decision by means of a utilitarian criterion of moral rightness?

Hare’s answers to these questions are critically discussed, including his views on the satisfaction of preferences and the indirect use of the criterion as well as his requirement of prudence and his claim that it is not a philosophical question when to engage in critical thinking.


Article metrics loading...

Loading full text...

Full text loading...

This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error