2004
Volume 49, Issue 3
  • ISSN: 2542-6583
  • E-ISSN: 2590-3268

Abstract

Abstract

In this article I argue that traditionalism is a viable alternative to forms of foundationalism, relativism and skepticism. Assuming that foundationalism has collapsed, I consider various forms of relativism, including those of Sallie McFague and J. Runzo, and I argue that only relativism of reason and of truth should be rejected because they lead to fatal inconsistencies. Next, fallibilism, as a central component of traditionalism, is illustrated and compared to foundationalist and methodological dogmatism. After outlining other components of traditionalism, such as its holism, (moderate) realism and truth as an ideal standard, I discuss and reject objections to traditionalism by J. Margolis and D.Z. Phillips.

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/content/journals/10.5117/NTT1995.3.003.SAND
1995-07-01
2022-12-08
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