Het disjunctieve atheïsme van Herman Philipse | Amsterdam University Press Journals Online
Volume 62, Issue 1
  • ISSN: 2542-6583
  • E-ISSN: 2590-3268


This article offers a critique of Philipse’s main argument in favor of disjunctive atheism – that is, the view that either semantic or classic atheism is true – as presented in his well-known . After a number of preliminary comments, the authors argue against two crucial premises of the argument. First, they show that it does not follow from every religious proposition’s being outside of the domain of reason, that semantic atheism is true. Second, they explain why it does not follow from every proposition’s being within the domain of reason, that classic atheism is true.


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  • Article Type: Research Article
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