Volume 64, Issue 2
  • ISSN: 2542-6583
  • E-ISSN: 2590-3268


The author questions Gijs Dingemans’s account of a pluralist morality for the world by arguing that he disregards the crucial relation between basic moral rules and secondary rules and therefore overlooks the problem of the radical pluralism that follows from local interpretations of those basic rules. Showing in what ways pluralism differs from monism or dogmatism as well as from radical relativism, the author proceeds to develop some characteristics of what he calls the inter-traditional conversation between participants in differing life-view traditions.


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  • Article Type: Research Article
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