Fascism - Current Issue

In this editorial essay, the authors suggest that scholars of fascism can profitably pay greater attention to internet activism, digital subcultures, and online content. We explore this issue by calling for what we have termed ‘Fascism Studies 2.0’—a digital turn in the field of comparative fascist studies. The first section briefly delineates the importance of the internet in promoting contemporary forms of fascism and far-right activism, before turning to online gaming cultures and their connections with the far right—including the ‘gamification’ of terrorism—as a case study. The necessity of analysing online contexts through the lens of fascism studies is then further established through a detailed exploration of the militant accelerationist culture, a movement that has developed in recent times, and which is deeply imbued with fascist qualities. This aspect of fascism 2.0 is also powerfully emotive, and the discussion here also reflects on the need for fascism studies to engage effectively with the affective/emotional turn in the humanities and social sciences.

In this article, three leading scholars of comparative fascism studies offer their thoughts and reflections on the state of the field. It seeks to stimulate debate and reflection on how to study fascism in the years to come and addresses a number of challenges facing this area of study. Aristotle Kallis focuses on the need to recognise the value of ‘associational’ perspectives, to highlight how fascism historically drew together a constellation of ideas on powerful ways that allowed a new form of politics to emerge. Roger Griffin builds on this discussion by warning that the term ‘fascism’ is in danger of becoming overused, especially to comment on contemporary developments, and such over-inflation threatens the term’s analytical value in identifying political forms that aspire to revolutionary change. Finally, Constantin Iordachi concludes the article by addressing East Central European contexts and explores the relationship between fascist radicalisations and de-democratisation processes, both in the interwar period and following the collapse of communist states from 1989 to highlight the continued importance of fascism as a tool for the study of ongoing contexts as well as the past.

This article argues that the US South’s connections—commonalities, networks, and exchanges—and political response to European fascism were distinct from the rest of the United States during the interwar period. While the allegations of fascism levelled against the South by its critics were exaggerated, it was the US region that most closely mirrored the racial, labor, and political practices of fascist Europe during the 1930s. These similarities underpinned the region’s relatively affirmative political response to fascism as demonstrated by the discourse of southern politicians. Quantitative analysis and case studies illuminate how southern politicians engaged in the discourse of fascism to influence both domestic and foreign policy. Domestically, the South’s political response to fascism limited the scope of the New Deal and served as a rhetorical strawman against the expansion of civil rights; globally, it encouraged admirers of fascism and acted as a drag on the United States’ ability to contain European fascism on the international stage.

After 2010, Viktor Orbán and Fidesz, Hungary’s governing party, established a distinctive governmental and social system that has become a reference point for several right-wing politicians internationally. This system draws heavily on the intellectual traditions of mid-twentieth-century Hungarian authoritarian conservatism, as well as on domestic historical fascist and nationalist radical-right ideologies. This article advances two main arguments. First, it examines the predominance of anti-Enlightenment elements within this political system and its underlying ideology, demonstrating that, while the level of aggression may not match that of many historical extreme-right and fascist parties and movements, their ideological roots are similar. Second, it explores how domestic policies intertwine with foreign influences, resulting in a relatively stable—albeit oppressive—ideological and governmental system that also adopts techniques employed by authoritarian leaders elsewhere.

This paper examines how social exclusion and relative deprivation foster extremist ideologies among Muslim minorities and ethnic majorities in four Northwestern European countries and to what extent theories of fascism can help to unravel these contemporary trends. We identify three key findings based on extensive interview data from the DRIVE project. First, minority and majority participants express ideological positions sharing structural similarities with historical fascism, including perceptions of cultural threat, economic grievances, and desires for societal transformation. Second, these elements manifest distinctly: for ethnic majorities as nativist sentiments and calls for cultural homogeneity, and for Muslim minorities as totalising religious-political worldviews rejecting liberal pluralism. Third, social exclusion creates ‘cognitive openings’ for extremist narratives in both populations, but through different pathways: majorities through perceived cultural threats and economic insecurity, minorities through discrimination and cultural alienation. Here, we see critical divergences from theories of fascism, with minorities facing different processes as the result of exclusion from majority society. Ultimately, use of such theories has notable limitations, but helps to track different patterns of social exclusion and the normalisation of exclusionary ideologies. Our analysis bridges fascism studies and radicalisation research while highlighting the increasing significance of relative deprivation in driving contemporary patterns of extremism.