Journal of Law, Religion and State - Volume 13, Issue 2/3, 2025

The “Russian world” (Russkiy mir) ideology has become one of the most relevant variables that must be assessed to understand the current shifts in cultural, religious, geopolitical, and legal discourses on contemporary Russia. It has profound implications in all these domains and, concerning the law, impacts the Russian legal system and its relationship with international law and human rights. This article first outlines the main elements of the “Russian world” ideology. It then explores how this ideology shapes a distinctive conception of Russian sovereignty, examining its implications for Russia’s relationships with other countries, and particularly the legality of its interventions in Ukraine in the context of the ongoing war. The discussion then turns to the interaction between the “Russian world” ideology and legal norms on freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, with particular attention to national security concerns. The following section assesses the broader impact of Russkiy mir on other human rights. The contribution concludes with some reflections on the significance of these findings.

In early 2024, Patriarch Kirill, leader of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (ROC), placed his proverbial cards on the table by declaring Russia’s aggression against Ukraine nothing less than a “holy war.” Although much evidence had already accumulated against the Patriarch for his steadfast commitment to President Putin’s illegal war, until this point very few of Ukraine’s partners had taken any meaningful measures against Kirill or his church in response. This unabashed and full-throated declaration, however, must serve as a wakeup call; action against the ROC’s wholesale endorsement of Kremlin misadventure—including the church’s involvement in the deportation and forcible transfer of Ukrainian children and public incitement to hatred and genocide—can no longer be merely an afterthought. To confront this reality, the article unpacks and explains away the faulty rationales used to preempt the imposition of sanctions on certain ROC institutions and officials. Following this assessment, the article closes by sketching out what a more unified and coherent sanctions regime might look like, and how it can serve as part of a larger concerted effort directed at securing accountability for ROC actions, including its ongoing efforts to consolidate and normalize Russian control over annexed and occupied Ukrainian territory.

International crimes have been alleged throughout the ongoing war in Ukraine with potential liability focused on political and military leaders and low-level combatants. One group that has thus far been overlooked for potential involvement in international crimes are religious leaders. There is evidence that leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), in particular, Patriarch Kirill, influence the Russian political and military leaders, the public, and believers. This influence could involve participation in international crimes. Not investigating or questioning this influence could allow impunity to be perpetuated.

This article explores whether leaders of the ROC could be prosecuted for international crimes arising during the Russia-Ukraine war. Specifically focusing on ROC Patriarch Kirill, it discusses whether a prosecution is likely. The article is not meant to set forward a complete case against Kirill, rather, it is an important starting point to open the discussion, based on publicly available evidence. After highlighting Kirill’s participation in the war, the article discusses the potential courts which could consider such a case. Then, the possible crimes including aggression, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, followed by the potential modes are liability are assessed. Finally, the Media Case from the International Criminal Tribunal from Rwanda is used as an analogous case to examine whether Kirill could be prosecuted as a propagandist. The article concludes that there is not currently enough evidence to raise a prosecution, however if more evidence was discovered or Kirill’s actions and statements became more extreme, a prosecution could be possible.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has created enormous threats and challenges to Ukraine and Ukrainians in a variety of spheres. Religion is no exception. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has endorsed and supported Putin’s attack of Ukraine. In response, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted Law No. 3894-IX banning the ROC and establishing a procedure to ban the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and its organizations as affiliated with the ROC unless they cut their connections with the ROC. Our analysis shows that the law does not comply with international FoRB standards. This conclusion is based on two basic premises. First, FoRB is a non-derogable right and cannot be limited by merely referring to the state of existential emergency; even in times of war, FoRB limitations must meet the necessity test required by Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Second, while the war can potentially justify broader FoRB limitations, the law does not comply with the necessity requirement as, given publicly available information, the Ukrainian government has so far failed to demonstrate that the UOC is institutionally involved in the activities undermining national security. Consequently, in violation of Article 18.3 of the ICCPR, the law imposes the ban merely for religious reasons (ecclesiastical connections with the Russian church) and is not necessary.

With a primary focus on the Baltic states and Ukraine, this article examines the legal discourse and responses in post-Soviet states to real and perceived threats to (national) security in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. The article analyzes measures taken in light of the international human rights obligations. In this regard, the focus is on the practice of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. The article probes criteria for bans and restrictions on religious communities on grounds of security, as well as measures against religious leadership and community members. While security of the state and its people is important, it can be argued that some of the measures taken by both Ukraine and the Baltic states are problematic from an international human rights perspective. In situations of conflict and insecurity there is a danger of the securitization of rights.

The paper deals with the implications of treating law as an instrument and religion as a question of state security, from both a majority as well as a minority faith group perspective. Labelled as a “policy of counteraction”, the recent legislative initiatives undertaken by the Ukrainian state, currently at war with Russia, (particularly those affecting the branch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church connected to Russia) affect the exercise of freedom of religion or belief. They shift the debate on law-making in connection to fundamental rights protection and the role of the state in socio-legal terms in several ways. Using the theoretical frameworks of legal instrumentalism and lawfare, the paper discusses, first, the use(s) of law within the current war between Russia and Ukraine; second, how recent legislative action related to religious freedoms in Ukraine can be interpreted as part of religious lawfare; third, the implications of religious lawfare for religious diversity management in Ukraine.