2004

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to describe the potential successful revenue models for preventive health care and thus identify barriers that hinder collaboration among stakeholders. As such, this paper aims to contribute to designing revenue models for preventive health care by taking a financial perspective. Moreover, by using game theory as an analytical framework for cooperation, this paper aims to contribute to the literature on applications of game theory in a practical context. In this study, desk research was applied to better understand the context of prevention in health care and to distinguish which elements from game theory could be relevant to explain the phenomenon. By recognising the significance of public servant leadership, barriers hindering the development and implementation of revenue models for preventive health care can be effectively addressed. The general findings of the research indicate that there are indeed identifiable and designable revenue models for preventive health care, particularly when considering prevention from an economic perspective as an investment decision. The role to be played by public servant leaders appears to be not only to enable prevention, but also to act as essential arbiters of the ‘prevention game’.


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/content/papers/10.5117/PULE2025.1.014.MAZA
2025-07-15
2025-12-13
/content/papers/10.5117/PULE2025.1.014.MAZA
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