f Religion between Liberty and Equality

References

1.  See Gedicks, Religious Freedom, 142–143.
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2.  Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).
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3.  Gedicks, Religious Freedom, 133. The same remark is made by Rex Ahdar (The Empty Idea of Equality Meets the Unbearable Fullness of Religion, in this Journal) in the context of a critical overview of the liberal-democratic approach to freedom of religion (the approach that is upheld by Gedicks): “Religion is no longer special or distinctive but is simply lumped into a category along with other things important to personal identity such as political affiliations, racial or ethnic background, sexuality or marital status… If religion is not special then there is no need to single it out for separate mention or protection.”
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4.  See S.N. Balagangadhara, “The Heathen in His Blindness…” Asia, the West and the Dynamic of Religion (Leiden: Brill, 1994); Prakash Shah, Legal responses to religious diversity (or to cultural diversity?), in Silvio Ferrari (ed.), Routledge Handbook, 119–132.
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5.  See Silvio Ferrari, Models, 204–205.
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6.  See Marco Ventura, “Italy,” in International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Religion(Alphen aan den Rijn, Wolters Kluwer, 2013), 87ff.
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7.  See John R. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2006).
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8.  See Philip Petchey, “Legal Issues for Faith Schools in England and Wales,” in Ecclesiastical Law Journal, v. 10, 2008, 174–190.
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9.  See Mohamed Keshavjee, Islam, Sharia and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Mechanisms for Legal Redress in the Muslim Community (London: Tauris, 2013).
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10.  Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 21.
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