Journal of Law, Religion and State - Volume 4, Issue 1, 2015

Male ritual circumcision is one of the most frequently conducted surgical procedures in the world, and constitutes an important aspect of the Jewish and Muslim religions. When in May 2012 a German court in Cologne allegedly “banned” the procedure, legal uncertainty in Germany set in and emotions worldwide ran high against the decision. In December 2012, the German parliament enacted a law explicitly granting parents the right to have their sons circumcised. This article revisits the complex and unique criminological, legal-dogmatic, and constitutional debates and processes that shaped both the earlier court decision and the later legislation. It presents the facts of the case, explains the arguments for and against the legality of the procedure that were raised in the legal debate that preceded and accompanied the court ruling, and analyzes the new law that now regulates the matter.

The formation of Hindu law has been chronicled by historians and others as a complex process involving the negation of customary law and the upholding of sacred texts, upon which codes of law were formulated. This paper seeks to interrogate the truth behind this narrative by examining the category of Hindu law and the processes that allowed it to emerge within the British colonial legal imagination. It argues that the making of Hindu law was a process of theologisation within an outer framework of secularisation i.e. the Christian theological framework embedded in the secular framework of Western legal epistemology was the background by which “Hindu law” emerged in the eyes of the colonisers. It examines Western legal notions of divine law, natural law, and human law and the role of historical jurisprudence in this process. It finally concludes by examining the implications of the argument for the formation of secular legal systems.

The aim of the discussion in this article is to explore two different Rabbinic explanations for the status of repentance in human and divine punishment, and to emphasize the essential distinction between them. According to the first explanation the source of accepting repentance is divine mercy upon human beings. Since mercy is not a legitimate consideration in conviction or even in determination of punishment in Jewish criminal law there is no wonder why repentance does not have any role during the criminal procedures in rabbinic court. According to the second explanation the acceptance of repentance by God is similar to the acceptance of flattery and bribe by a Roman corrupted judge. God decides to accept repentance and to forgive the transgressors since it better serves God’s interests. This analogy between repentance and flattery and bribery then explains why rabbinic courts do not take repentance into account.