2004
Volume 1, Issue 3
  • ISSN: 2212-4810
  • E-ISSN: 2212-6465

Abstract

How can the law deal with religion in an adequate manner, if on one hand it must guarantee religion its status of autonomy and therefore cannot construct its own idea of religion, and on the other it needs to know the object of legal protection? The present paper scrutinizes one possible solution to this problem developed by the German Federal Constitutional Court. According to this judicial strategy, the law orients itself by referring to the relevance of religious self-concepts that are to a certain degree legally binding.

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2012-01-01
2026-01-30
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References

  1.  James Boyd White, “Talking About Religion in the Language of Law”, supranote 1, at 130 et sq.
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  2.  See Niklas Luhmann, “The Autonomy of the Legal System”, in The Differentiation of Society(1982), 122.
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  3.  R. Scott Appleby, “What’s in a Name? ‘Fundamentalism’ and the Discourse about Religion”, in How Should We Talk about Religion?, supra note 1, at 86, 87.
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  4.  See Luhmann, “The Autonomy of the Legal System”, supranote 13, at 137.
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  5.  See Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge”, supranote 1, at 55. Generally on Derrida’s concept of religion John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida. Religion without Religion (1997).
    [Google Scholar]
  6.  Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge”, supranote 1, at 68.
    [Google Scholar]
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