Journal of Law, Religion and State - Volume 1, Issue 1, 2012

I have two purposes in this essay: first, to argue that morality forms a central part of a liberal education and to say something about how it is properly taught; second, to argue more specifically that the moral virtues required by democratic citizenship, and the rights and obligations that citizenship entails, should figure in school curricula, and then to consider the conflicts with religious authority that this is sure to produce.

This Article draws upon, but reworks, John Rawls’ framework from Political Liberalism to determine the degree of educational autonomy that illiberal perfectionist religious groups ought to enjoy in a liberal state. I start by arguing that Rawls mistakenly concludes that political liberalism flatly cannot accommodate Perfectionists, and that his misstep is attributable to two errors: (1) Rawls utilizes an overly restrictive “political conception of the person” in determining who participates in the original position, and (2) Rawls overlooks the possibility of a “federalist” basic political structure that can afford significant political autonomy to different groups within a single country. With these insights, I argue that some, though not all, religious Perfectionists are consistent with a stable liberal polity, and explain why foundational Rawlsian premises require that Perfectionists be accommodated to the extent possible.

My ultimate conclusions are that liberal polities ought to grant significant autonomy to those illiberal groups that satisfy specified conditions, and that the autonomy of such “eligible” illiberal groups is subject to two further constraints, which I call “well-orderedness” and “opt-out.” The autonomy to which eligible Perfections are entitled includes the authority to educate their children in a way that provides a fair opportunity for the groups to perpetuate themselves. The constraint of well-orderedness, however, permits the State to impose educational requirements that facilitate peace and political stability. Accommodating eligible illiberal groups, subject to these constraints, is an instantiation of liberal commitments, not a compromise of liberal values.

Places of contact between religion and the state has increased considerably over time; as this overlap has increased, liberals have increasingly seen fit to call for state intervention in religions that are internally discriminatory in the name of equal citizenship. By looking at the issue of direct and indirect state support for discriminatory schools, I argue for a more pluralistic and tolerant view of religion than that of many liberals. Preserving diversity is an important liberal good that should not lost sight of, though there are limits to the kinds of discrimination the liberal state should support. Much of my argument rests on the distinction between direct and indirect support. The liberal state should impose strict standards on funds it grants directly to organizations, but it should be more relaxed for indirect support it gives, except in exceptional circumstances.

This study compares separation of religion and state (SRAS) as it is conceived in theory with its realization in practice in 40 stable Christian democracies between 1990 and 2008 based on data from the Religion and State Round 2 dataset. There is no agreement in the literature on how SRAS ought to be conceived. Many scholars argue that SRAS is a necessary condition for liberal democracies. The present study examines four models of SRAS found in the literature, and a non-SRAS model that addresses the appropriate role of religion in democracies: secularism-laicism, absolute SRAS, neutral political concern, exclusion of ideals, and acceptable support for religion. The study analyzes three factors: (a) whether the state supports one or some religions more than others; (b) the extent of religious legislation; and (c) restrictions on the religious practices and institutions of religious minorities. The analysis shows that depending on the definition of SRAS used, between zero and eight of the 40 countries practice SRAS. Based on this finding, I conclude that either SRAS is not a necessary condition for liberal democracy or many states commonly considered to be liberal democracies are not.