Journal of Law, Religion and State - Volume 3, Issue 3, 2014

The present paper is concerned with the role emotions play with respect to evaluative legal concepts, a class of concepts that require judges to interpret values in their application of the law. The paper focuses on the legal concept of human dignity, a central concept in international human rights law and in the constitutional practice of many states. Nearly every article or book written on the concept of human dignity begins by noting its resonance and the power of its promise. The affective dimension of the concept is, however, soon set aside by most scholars and legal practitioners in order to work out the term’s content. Against this trend, the paper explores the affective dimensions of the legal concept of human dignity.

Situated in the field of comparative human rights, the paper examines the various roles emotions play in judicial interpretations of the concept of human dignity in human rights and constitutional law. The paper begins by offering a working definition of emotion before setting out the challenge to legal theory and practice posed by evaluative legal concepts. It then sketches out the landscape of dignity jurisprudence and various key sites for the study of emotion. The paper then develops a typology of roles that emotions play in judicial interpretations of the legal concept of human dignity. The three roles that emotions play, orientation, tracker, and service, draw upon the unique features of emotions to enliven and direct judicial understandings of the concept. Emotions fulfill orientation roles when they imbue a concept with their own meaning, tracker roles when they react to the subject matter of the concept, and service roles when they guide the use of the concept. Each role contributes an additional layer of meaning to the concept by lending structure, and often a sense of importance and clarity, to judicial interpretations of human dignity.

Conventional wisdom holds that judges ought to be emotionless. Occasional counterclaims, however, have posited compassion as an essential element of judicial wisdom. When compassion is thus privileged, it is understood as uniquely parental.

We use as our lens two examples, one ancient and one modern: the disqualification, in the Babylonian Talmud, of childless men from judging capital cases on the ground that they are “devoid of paternal tenderness,” and Judge Julian Mack’s vision of the early 20th century juvenile court judge as a “wise and merciful father.” In both narratives judges are asked to have the capacity for empathy, which is believed to spark compassion, which in turn is predicted to manifest in mercy. In neither narrative, however, is this empathic arc seen as critical for judging in the ordinary case. A contemporary study showing the jurisprudential impact of fathering daughters represents a modern iteration of the judge-as-caring-parent meme.

The present paper analyzes the substance of the right to establish and maintain places of worship in order to reveal the elements that make up its conceptual core. First, the process of international standard-setting in human rights is explained, in particular the important contribution of the un Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief to standard-setting. Second, the paper summarizes the outcomes of the standard-setting activities of the un Human Rights Committee and of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief with respect to places of worship. The analysis demonstrates the significance of the right to establish and maintain places of worship − a key religious freedom norm which aims to ensure that the structural requirement of religious freedom is adequately met.