Journal of Law, Religion and State - Volume 5, Issue 3, 2017

This essay endeavours to restate the case for the right to freedom of conscience and religion. Specifically, it seeks to make the case for exemptions from the law of the land for religious believers and similarly-situated citizens who hold sincere conscientious beliefs. The rule of law is not something to be ignored, and carving out exemptions for conscience has been criticized as unfair, anomalous, potentially open-ended in scope, and difficult to administer. I attempt to assuage these legitimate concerns by underscoring the importance of the dignity of the individual and the virtue of protecting religious minorities (and dissenters of all stripes), who challenge the conventions of the day. If the default position is the rule of law, believers face an uphill task. Ultimately, only a truly liberal polity can offer protection to what, in every age, is a fragile liberty.

The paper addresses the dilemmas of civil-secular tribunals when formulating a position toward decisions of religious tribunals with regard to the custody of children. The paper examines the approach of the Israeli Supreme Court toward rulings of Sharia and rabbinical courts, comparing them with similar tensions in the US, Canada, and the UK. Civil courts appear to be entirely committed to civil, non-religious law. Religious tribunals, however, although committed to act in accordance with the fundamental principles of state civil law, are also obligated to act in accordance with religious law. The paper argues that the extent of the above tension is much more limited than it appears at first glance. There is an attempt to reconcile the need to protect women and children on one hand with freedom of religion, multiculturalism, and the rights of ethnic minorities and immigrants, on the other.

This article examines the state of regulation of religion within Singapore, which is the world’s most religiously diverse country. It considers how fundamental principles of the rule of law, religious liberty and legal pluralism operate within the constitutional order predicated on communitarianism and accommodative secularism. While the rule of law seeks to vindicate a range of values which requires sameness and satisfies claims for inclusion, limits to it through exemptions and accommodative measures that multiculturalism and pluralism may prescribe can protect differences and satisfy claims to be left alone, outside the sphere of state govenance. Drawing from Singapore case law, legislation and executive policy, it interrogates the question of whether a policy of multicultural and legal pluralism protective of religious freedom can be reconciled with the rule of law, which in this context is closely associated with the quasi constitutional objective of preserving racial and religious harmony.