2004
Volume 117, Issue 1
  • ISSN: 0002-5275
  • E-ISSN: 2352-1244

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper, I respond to the commentaries on my paper ‘You cannot be yourself on your own: An enactive approach to relational authenticity’. Some commentaries ask for clear boundaries, but I argue that a relational, context sensitive approach to authenticity, cannot provide black and white distinctions. Authenticity does refer to boundaries, but whether and when a boundary is crossed, depends on the persons, their context, and the history of their interactions. Other commentaries propose different conceptions of authenticity as self-affirmative participation or a congruence between self-experience and self-image. Both these conceptions remain individual-focused though, and thereby leave out the critical and moral dimension that characterizes enactive relational authenticity. The focus on self-affirmation instead of the balance between expression and impression that I propose, in particular leads to the danger of self-affirming bubbles becoming the hallmark of authenticity. Finally, several commentaries provide relevant extensions of my theory, focusing on authenticity and social roles, digital interactions and the moral values that my approach assumes, and safeguarding the vocabulary of discovering, creating, or choosing yourself. I discuss these proposals and point to the necessity of providing a more elaborated anthropological/moral basis for my enactive approach to relational authenticity.

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2025-03-01
2025-03-16
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