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The Underexposed Role of ‘Desert’ in the Political Philosophy of G.A. Cohen
Although the notion of desert occupies a prominent place in our common sense thinking about moral and political issues, it is notably absent from dominant theories of justice. This article examines the role of desert in the works of G.A. Cohen, a radical egalitarian and key theorist of justice. This study highlights that desert is an underexposed aspect of Cohen’s thinking. Desert is rarely associated with Cohen’s philosophy or his work is often misinterpreted in this regard. I demonstrate that, contrary to David Miller’s claims, desert is an essential concept for understanding Cohen’s philosophy. In an unpublished critique of Miller and one of his earliest contributions to normative political philosophy, Cohen defends an effort theory of desert; those who work more deserve a higher income. Nevertheless, in the same article, Cohen seems to express scepticism about the notion of desert. However, in Cohen’s later contributions, he revisits the concept, broadening its role and making it central to his theory of justice. Firstly, a shift can be observed within Cohen’s luck egalitarianism, the theory he supports: while choices or control initially serve as its sole normative basis, desert later gains significance. Secondly, Cohen implicitly defends a compensation theory of desert; those with a higher labor burden deserve compensation. This article contributes both to the understanding of G. A. Cohen’s egalitarian philosophy and the broader debate on justice and desert.