-
oa Zelfdoding en de waarde van een rationeel leven
- Amsterdam University Press
- Source: Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, Volume 110, Issue 4, Dec 2018, p. 453 - 472
-
- 01 Dec 2018
Abstract
Suicide and the value of a rational life
In recent Kantian discussions about suicide, it is not uncommon to find relatively ‘mild’ approaches towards suicide. Even though as a rule suicide is still impermissible, some argue that there may be circumstances that can make suicide morally permissible. If a person suffers such that she cannot be considered to have a rational life any more, suicide is no longer immoral because the object of the moral duty is no longer present. In this paper, I investigate this argumentative strategy by exploring what it might mean to have a ‘rational life’. I argue that on a minimal conception, people who suffer unbearably still lead rational lives and suicide is thus not morally justified. On substantial conceptions, however, not only does having a rational life become a contingent affair, it also leads to a more liberal approach towards suicide than ‘mild Kantians’ may be prepared to accept.