2004
Volume 111, Issue 3
  • ISSN: 0002-5275
  • E-ISSN: 2352-1244

Abstract

Abstract

This article explores the concept of self in relation to neuroscience. Four options are discussed on the basis of a key representative. The first is the dualist position where the non-material self controls its brain, as defended by Eccles. Next comes the option of the self as a relatively or completely powerless entity the brain, as exemplified by Libet’s experiments on free will. The third option is the identity of self and brain, as argued by Dennett. The last option is the identity of self and body, and here Gallagher is the representative. It is shown that no monist position is completely consistently defended. In the conclusion, four factors are identified that hinder a simple and consistent monist conceptualisation of the self in the context of neuroscience.

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2019-10-01
2021-06-22
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  • Article Type: Research Article
Keyword(s): body; body-awareness; brain; Dennett; dualism; Eccles; Gallagher; Libet; monism; neuroscience; Popper; self
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