NTT Journal for Theology and the Study of Religion - Volume 58, Issue 3, 2004

The author discusses the question whether the introduction of the term ‘theodicy’ by Leibniz marks the introduction of a new approach to the problem of evil, and whether the term ‘theodicy’ should be reserved for this modern approach. He argues that the premodern approach to theodicy is less monolithic than is sometimes assumed, and that some aspects of the ‘modern’ approach to evil can be traced back to the Bible. While the Enlightenment led to changes in the Western approach to evil, then, these changes are not so radical that the term ‘theodicy’ should be reserved for post-Enlightenment approaches to evil only.

In recent years several important books have been devoted to the problem of divine justice in the ancient Near East and the Old Testament. After a short introduction to these works, four models of theodicy are discussed in which presumed injustice on the part of God or the gods is countered by granting human beings more freedom to act autonomously.

The problem of theodicy occurs when the suffering of innocent men has to be related to God, who is considered both almighty and good. In the writings of the New Testament God is depicted as both at the same time. Basically, the solutions given to the problem of evil are that either man or the devil is responsible for it; not God. Unlike the modern view, the basic idea is that no man is innocent over against God. Theories about the origin of evil are less important in NT writings than the presentation of its defeat through Christ.

Barth’s thinking on the origins of evil seems to be among the most complex in his Church Dogmatics. There is especially the highly problematic passage where Barth says that evil (‘das Nichtige’) exists because God does not will it and ‘not only what God wills, but what He does not will, is potent, and must have a real correspondence (CD III/3, 352).’ By examining Barth’s thoughts on salvation history, on God’s indignant rejection of any life outside his covenant of grace and care, and on God’s allowing evil, the author seeks to give a plausible and understandable exegesis of this difficult passage and he tries to show that Barth’s ideas are still relevant.

If Yoder is right in holding that pacifism is the appropriate behaviour for the Christian community, how does this relate to what we may expect from God? The answer depends on the question whether God and humans are both bound by one universal morality. In this paper it is argued that the existence of such a universal morality doesn’t warrant divine beneficence toward humans. Such a morality also fails to account for God’s being-God and does not consider the limited scope of morality as an instrument to direct human welfare. Conceding this, however, does not preclude the possibility of a theodicy; such a theodicy stems not from an alledged universal morality, but from God’s own goodness. Despite falling short of justifying Divine pacifism, such a perspective may nevertheless provide reasons to question Divine violence.

The author gives an overview of a number of empirical-theological research projects with regard to religious models of reality referring to theodicy. The projects all are based on the pioneering work of the team around the Dutch scholars Vossen (Tilburg) and Van der Ven (Nijmegen). The essential point of the theodicy research projects was the question how adequate pastoral care can be provided in situations of suffering.