Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte - Volume 107, Issue 4, 2015

The End of Boredom

Boredom has been admired for its audacity to see human life as it is: ultimately without meaning. Moreover, boredom has been attributed the power to overcome itself. The contention is that it is sufficient not to resist boredom. In this article I oppose these views. First, I describe and analyze boredom as a bipolar mood: on the one hand the person who is bored experiences a generalized loss of meaning in ordinary life, on the other hand he is oriented towards something extraordinary, but indefinite (or at least underdetermined) that will reinstate meaning in life. The person who is deeply bored is deadlocked between these two poles. The deadlock of this bipolar state has gotten a peculiarly keen edge in modern society. I argue next that neither of the poles of boredom has the capacity to end the mood. The expectation that in a state of generalized meaninglessness something meaningful will reveal itself, is an illusion and part of the deadlock of boredom. It deepens boredom. Finally, I outline an alternative way of ending boredom that implies that one should resist the mood. We should object to the person who is bored that the generalization of his deprecation of what has meaning in ordinary life to basic human interests and activities, makes no sense. These things cannot be meaningfully doubted without one’s becoming an outsider to human life. I grant that an argument alone cannot end a mood. It is at least as important to seduce the person who is bored to reengage with these basic interests and activities. As an outsider who postpones life indefinitely, he cannot fully understand their meaning.

Representation and Sensibility. The Rancière-Lyotard Debate on Art

If representation means making something present again, what is its relationship to sensibility, especially in art? Could the work of art represent our sensory inputs, or does such representation always fall short of the adequate re-presentation of the sensory? The debate on representation and sensibility has been reopened within a new framework with Rancière’s distinction between three historical regimes of art. This article sets out by casting doubt on Rancière’s assumption that representation could be reduced to one of these three regimes. Secondly, discussion turns to Rancière’s criticism of Lyotard’s notion of unrepresentability, particularly with regard to ‘Auschwitz’. Thirdly, the question is put why these two authors have such different readings of Kant’s aesthetics: Rancière’s choice for beauty is actually a choice for representation, whereas to Lyotard, the unrepresentable sublime creates the space for the event in our sensibility. Finally, it is shown that Rancière, though acknowledging a tension between ‘spirit’ and ‘letter’, ignores the meaning of avant-garde art, whereas Lyotard distrusts realistic, representative art.

I won’t, but my colleague will: referral as a solution for conscientious objections in the workplace

A policy of ‘refusing and referring’ allows conscientious objectors to refrain from the action they object to, as long as they can refer to a willing colleague. This policy is often presented as a pragmatic solution to the problem of conscientious objection in the workplace. In this paper, I reflect on the merits and the shortcomings of this strategy. I will analyse the current situation in Belgium and in the Netherlands (section 2), where ‘refusal and referral’ is a preferred way to deal with conscientious objections. This context serves as a touchstone for arguments about conscientious objection in the workplace. Contrary to those authors that dismiss it as merely pragmatic, I argue that referral responds to value conflicts that are unavoidable in pluralistic liberal democracies (section 3). And contrary to those who criticize it as a tactical, non-moral compromise, I argue in section 4 that it is in some cases pervaded by moral values like respect for others. Finally, in section 5 I show that referral does not necessarily clash with professional values, but that it can be problematic when it confirms patterns of discrimination.

The state of political philosophy1

In this article we attempt to do what is by definition impossible: providing a complete picture of the discipline of political philosophy today. We start by presenting the three thematic subfields in which most research seems to be taking place: democracy (including such topics as deliberation, representation, radical democracy, republicanism, and populism), justice (which covers such diverse topics as capabilities, intergenerational justice, and linguistic justice), and what we call the ‘postnational constellation’. This latter subfield in particular is growing ever larger. The context of globalization increasingly urges political philosophers to reformulate all classical questions about democracy and justice, as is visible in discussions about global justice, governance, cosmopolitanism, federalism, or the ‘commons’. After surveying the main themes of contemporary political philosophy, we discuss a number of methodological evolutions and controversies. We look for instance at the role of intellectual-historical research; not only does the quality and the quantity of such research continue to rise, it is also well-connected to contemporary debates and clearly inspires and refines these debates. Most attention, though, is given to the ongoing confrontation between ‘normative’ political theorists and so-called ‘realists’. The former believe that political philosophers should not just contemplate social and political reality, but should also propose guidelines for the (re)design of social institutions, and should maybe even actively contribute to realizing these proposals. ‘Realists’, by contrast, believe that political philosophy, as a branch of philosophy, should aim for insight in the dynamics of political action, in human relations and motivations as they become visible in politics, and in the role of the political sphere in society. We conclude our article with a critical note on the incompleteness of our survey.