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You can’t be yourself on your own: An enactive approach to relational authenticity
In this paper, I develop an enactive account of relational authenticity. Starting from the assumption that we are relational beings, what then does it mean to be yourself? I first introduce some examples of (in)authenticity and subsequently discuss three main views on authenticity: namely that we discover, create, or choose ourselves. Despite their differences, these views all suffer from the same shortcoming in that they present authenticity as an (intra)individual matter, relying on (intra)individual introspection to achieve or safeguard being authentic. I then discuss Gallagher, Morgan, and Rokotnitz’ (2018) notion of relational authenticity and argue that it has some important shortcomings. I introduce an enactive account of relational authenticity instead, that distinguishes between experiential and existential authenticity. Experiential authenticity consists in the correspondence between experience and expression in concrete situations. Existential authenticity refers to the extent to which you manage to enact your values in your life. For relational selves, being yourself does not equate unlimited self-expression, but rather requires genuine interactions in which both participants balance self-expression with impression, with being moved. Too much impression ultimately leads an implosion of the self while too much expression implies a loss of contact with others and with reality. Finally, I point to the moral and critical potential of an enactive account of relational authenticity.