2004
Volume 107, Issue 3
  • ISSN: 0002-5275
  • E-ISSN: 2352-1244

Abstract

Abstract

Who deals with scientism soon discovers that scientism can be interpreted in many different ways. Most interpretations of scientism are so radical that they can hardly be defended, or so modest that they are nothing more than trivial platitudes nobody would disagree with. This poses a dilemma for adherents of scientism. Yet, in this article I will propose a particular interpretation of scientism that does seem defensible, while at the same time cannot be put away as being merely a trivial platitude. Having such a maximally fruitful interpretation of scientism does not help the adherents of scientism, though. For it entails a falsehood, namely that metaphysics cannot give us insights in the overall structure and nature of reality. I shall argue for this by fleshing out an interpretation of metaphysics, on which we can certainly say that metaphysics enables us to acquire said insights. Finally, I will discuss and assess a number of objections against my refutation of the aforementioned maximally fruitful interpretation of scientism.

Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.5117/ANTW2015.3.RUTT
2015-11-30
2021-12-09
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

/deliver/fulltext/00025275/107/3/06_ANTW1205.3.RUTT.html?itemId=/content/journals/10.5117/ANTW2015.3.RUTT&mimeType=html&fmt=ahah
http://instance.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.5117/ANTW2015.3.RUTT
Loading
  • Article Type: Research Article
Keyword(s): a priori intuitions; epistemology; metaphysics; positivism; science; scientism
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error