2004
Volume 107, Issue 3
  • ISSN: 0002-5275
  • E-ISSN: 2352-1244

Abstract

Abstract

Scientism, the view that only scientifically supported beliefs are epistemically justified, faces two influential problems: (1) scientism itself does not seem to be scientifically supported and hence self-referentially incoherent; and (2) scientism seems to dismiss many plausible ordinary beliefs as unjustified. In this paper, we show that both problems presuppose a needlessly narrow conception of science and that when scientism is based on a broader, more realistic conception of science neither problem arises. Furthermore, we argue that our variant of scientism is still strong enough to have philosophical bite.

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/content/journals/10.5117/ANTW2015.3.VERH
2015-11-30
2022-05-26
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  • Article Type: Research Article
Keyword(s): common sense; science; scientism; self-referential incoherence
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