Opschorting en onenigheid | Amsterdam University Press Journals Online
Volume 108, Issue 1
  • ISSN: 0002-5275
  • E-ISSN: 2352-1244



Some sceptics claim that in cases of peer disagreement, we ought to suspend judgment about the topic of discussion. In this paper, we argue that the sceptic’s conclusions are only correct in scenarios. We show that the sceptic’s conclusion is built on two premises (the and the ) and argue that both premises are incorrect. First, we show that although it is often rational to suspend judgment when an epistemic peer disagrees with you, peer disagreements are not symmetrical. Next, we argue that even if one assumes that peer disagreements symmetrical, it might still be rational to stick to one’s guns in the light of peer disagreement.


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