2004
Volume 108, Issue 1
  • ISSN: 0002-5275
  • E-ISSN: 2352-1244

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper, I consider a form of skepticism that has a conclusion, according to which we are rationally permitted to suspend judgment in an area, to have beliefs in that area. I argue that such a form of skepticism is resistant to some traditional strategies of refutation. It also carries a benefit, namely that it increases voluntary control over doxastic states by introducing options, and therefore greater freedom, into the realm of belief. I argue that intellectual preferences and dispositions provide decisive reasons that can settle our doxastic states in such cases.

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/content/journals/10.5117/ANTW2016.1.NICK
2016-02-28
2021-11-28
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