Wat betekent het dat complottheorieën mainstream worden | Amsterdam University Press Journals Online
2004
Volume 116, Issue 1
  • ISSN: 0002-5275
  • E-ISSN: 2352-1244

Abstract

Abstract

In debates about conspiracy theories, it is often claimed that conspiracy thinking is on the rise or has even become mainstream. In this article, I want to explore this claim conceptually, and argue that there are at least three ways to interpret the claim that ‘conspiracy thinking has become mainstream’. First, there is the individual level, where it is a matter of counting heads. Mainstream then means that the majority believes in conspiracy theories. But there are two other levels. There is the institutional level, which is about whether conspiracy theories circulate within social institutions in an acceptable way. Is it acceptable to express conspiracy theories as a politician, scientist or journalist? Mainstream here means that dominant institutions in society view conspiracy thinking as an acceptable form of communication. Finally, there is the cultural level. Here the question is whether conspiracy thinking is a culturally acceptable way of speaking and thinking about society. Is it socially accepted as normal behavior, or is it rather a form of deviant behavior, accompanied by (informal) sanctions or demands for additional justification or proof? Mainstream here means that conspiracy thinking is seen as a normal way of speaking, without being accompanied by strange looks, shunning or the need to justify oneself as a conspiracy thinker. By making this distinction, we can think more clearly about whether conspiracy thinking is actually on the rise, and how we should deal with it.

Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.5117/ANTW2024.1.004.SIMO
2024-03-01
2024-04-28
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

References

  1. Anton, A. und Schink, A. (2021). Der Kampf um die Wahrheit: Verschwörungstheorien zwischen Fake, Fiktion and Fakten. München: Komplett Media.
    [Google Scholar]
  2. Aupers, S. (2002). ‘Everything is connected’: Naar een sociologie van paranoia en complottheorieën. Tijdschrift Sociologie49(3), pp. 313-326.
    [Google Scholar]
  3. Bertuzzi, N. (2021). Conspiracy Theories and Social Movements Studies: A Research Agenda. Sociology Compass15(12).
    [Google Scholar]
  4. Boltanski, L. (2012). Énigmes et complots. Une enquête à propos d’enquêtes. Paris: Gallimard.
    [Google Scholar]
  5. Butter, M. (2014). Plots, Designs, and Schemes: American Conspiracy Theories From The Puritans To The Present. Boston: De Gruyter.
    [Google Scholar]
  6. Butter, M. (2018). ‘Nichts ist, wie es scheint‘. Über Verschwörungstheorien. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
    [Google Scholar]
  7. Butter, M. and Reinkowski, M. (2014). Conspiracy Theories in the United States and the Middle East. Boston: De Gruyter.
    [Google Scholar]
  8. Dentith, M. (2018). Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
    [Google Scholar]
  9. Durbach, N. (2005). Bodily matters: the anti-vaccination movement in England, 1853-1907. Durham: Duke University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  10. Garwood, C. (2008). Flat Earth: The History of an Infamous Idea. New York: Thomas Dunne Books.
    [Google Scholar]
  11. Hagen, K. (2022). Conspiracy Theories and The Failure of Intellectual Critique. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  12. Hopster, J. (2021). Mutual Affordances: The Dynamics Between Social Media and Populism. Media, Culture & Society43(3), pp. 551–560.
    [Google Scholar]
  13. Larson, H. (2020). Stuck: How Vaccine Rumors Start – and Why They Don’t Go Away. New York: Oxford University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  14. Laudan, L. (1996). Beyond Positivism and Relativism: Theory, Method, and Evidence. Boulder: Westview.
    [Google Scholar]
  15. Levy, N. (2007). Radically Socialized Knowledge and Conspiracy Theories. Episteme4(2), pp. 181–192.
    [Google Scholar]
  16. McKensie-McHarg, A. (2019). Conspiracy Theory: The Nineteenth-Century Prehistory of a Twentieth-Century Concept. In J.E.Uscinski (Ed.), Conspiracy theories and the people who believe them. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  17. Muirhead, R. and Rosenblum, N. (2019). A Lot of People are Saying: The New Conspiracism and The Assault on Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  18. Olmstead, K. (2009). Real Enemies: Conspiracy Theories and American Democracy, World War I to 9/11. New York: Oxford University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  19. Parent, J. and Uscinski, J. (2014). American Conspiracy Theories. New York: Oxford University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  20. Pasulka, D. (2019). American Cosmic: UFOs, Religion, Technology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  21. Simons, M. (2017). Naar een emancipatie van de complottheorie. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 79(3), pp. 473-498.
    [Google Scholar]
  22. Simons, M. (2020). De nieuwe poortwachters van de waarheid. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie82(1), pp. 33-56.
    [Google Scholar]
  23. Simons, M. (2022a). Denken over complottheorieën is denken over instituten. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie84, pp. 372-392.
    [Google Scholar]
  24. Simons, M. (2022b). Een genealogie van het wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar complottheorieën. Tijdschrift over Cultuur & Criminaliteit12(2), pp. 20-39.
    [Google Scholar]
  25. Simons, M. (2023). Complotdenkers als regelbrekers. Filosofie-Tijdschrift33(4), pp. 15-21.
    [Google Scholar]
  26. Taylor, C. (2007). A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  27. Thalmann, K. (2019). The Stigmatization of Conspiracy Theory Since The 1950s: ‘A Plot to Make Us Look Foolish’. London: Routledge.
    [Google Scholar]
  28. Uscinski, J. E. (Ed.). (2019). Conspiracy Theories and The People Who Believe Them. New York: Oxford University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  29. Uscinski, J., Enders, A., Klofstad, C., Seelig, M., Drochon, H., Premaratne, K., Murthi, M., Richey, S. (2022). Have Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories Increased over Time?’PloS One17(7), pp. e0270429–e0270429, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0270429.
    [Google Scholar]
  30. Van Fraassen, B. (2002). The Empirical Stance. New Haven: Yale University Press.
    [Google Scholar]
  31. van Prooijen, J.., Wahring, I., Mausolf, L., Mulas, N., & Shwan, S. (2023). Just Dead, Not Alive: Reconsidering Belief in Contradictory Conspiracy Theories. Psychological Science, 34(6), pp. 670–682.
    [Google Scholar]
  32. Wood, M. J., Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2012). Dead and Alive: Beliefs in Contradictory Conspiracy Theories. Social Psychological & Personality Science3(6), 767–773.
    [Google Scholar]
  33. Zweistra, C. (2021). Waarheidszoekers: Wat bezielt complotdenkers?Utrecht: Kok-Boekencentrum.
    [Google Scholar]
http://instance.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.5117/ANTW2024.1.004.SIMO
Loading
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error