De paradoxen van (in)tolerantie in epistemische netwerken | Amsterdam University Press Journals Online
2004
Volume 116, Issue 1
  • ISSN: 0002-5275
  • E-ISSN: 2352-1244

Abstract

Abstract

Does the Capitol invasion of January 2021 teach us that intolerant viewpoints have no place in public debates? This view is defensible on the basis of Karl Popper’s paradox of tolerance, which states that too much tolerance will ultimately entail the demise of that very tolerance. But how are the limits of (in)tolerance to be determined? We argue that Popper’s purely epistemological interpretation of the concept of tolerance is untenable; determining such limits ultimately requires a political-normative interpretation. As an alternative epistemological perspective, we show how network epistemology can give us insight into how information, especially intolerant content, spreads through communities. This analysis can help us assess the consequences of potential interventions in public debates, and thus make informed choices.

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