Tijdschrift voor Agrarisch Recht - Current Issue

On 20 December 2019, the Supreme Court issued the judgment known as the Inscharing judgment. A few years later, on 31 January 2025, the Supreme Court issued a judgment in proceedings concerning residential tenancy law. Both judgments have in common that they are preceded by an opinion by Advocate General Valk, who, based on the well-known criteria of interpretation and qualification, arrives at an opinion that is followed by the Supreme Court in both cases. In his opinion for the Inscharing judgment, he was of the opinion that a lease agreement was involved. In the tenancy case, he concluded that there was no tenancy agreement. In this article, I will examine how Mr Valk assessed both issues, how the Supreme Court translated that assessment into its judgments and why the outcome in those cases is not the same, or at least appears not to be. This will also address the Timeshare judgment and the relationship between this judgment and the doctrine of interpretation and qualification.