Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte - Volume 106, Issue 3, 2014

What is the Role of Mental Imagery in Perception? A Defense of the Continuity Thesis

What is the nature of the mental image, and which role does mental imagery play in perception? According to David Hume and Immanuel Kant, the capacity to form images lends a constitutive contribution to our perception of the world. Both philosophers portray the imagination as a unifying power that connects perceptions of different objects of the same kind, and that connects different perceptions of the same object. I shall call this view the continuity thesis. Since the beginning of the 20^th century the continuity thesis is heavily under attack. Jean-Paul Sartre and Ludwig Wittgenstein emphasize the conceptual and phenomenological distinction between perception and mental imagery. These philosophers are sceptical about the important psychological and epistemological role that is traditionally attributed to imagery. The central target of critique against the continuity thesis is primarily the Humean view that mental images, however complex, can be traced back to pictures or ‘copies’ of sense impressions. It will be argued that the sceptics about mental imagery, even though they justifiably attack pictorialism, have no grounds to dismiss the continuity thesis. Then I shall discuss the reassessment of the mental image with the rise of cognitive science since the 1970s, and I shall argue that the continuity thesis is supported by the so-called ‘enactive’ theory of mental imagery.

Mental states in psychology

Many of our thoughts, emotions and motivations have intentional content: they are ‘about’ something. In this paper I present my VENI research project, which starts from the observation that the everyday practice of empirical psychological research is built on the idea that mental states have content. However, empirical psychology lacks a clear view on how mental content should be understood and how mental states could be causally efficacious in virtue of their content. I focus on mental states that play a role in psychiatric symptomatology, and develop an interpretivist answer to these questions. I also offer some suggestions showing how an interpretivist notion of mental content could be used in empirical research on psychiatric symptoms.

Anachronistic values

A value becomes anachronistic when it no longer fits current historical conditions (institutions, technology, culture, etc.). From an ‘idealist’ perspective, this fact does not tell against the old value (accepted as true), but rather against the new conditions. However, from a ‘naturalist’ perspective which takes values to be the product of human interests and (therefore) as interconnected with a given historical context, such a conflict seems to make a value obsolete. But this is neither an empirical law nor a normative rule. A defence of anachronistic values might still be perfectly reasonable. It is argued that such reasonableness depends mainly on three criteria: (un)certainty, scope and weight.

Secularization, A Multi-Layered Concept. On the Vicissitudes of Sociological and Philosophical Theories of Secularization

This article focuses on the historical evolution of the concept of ‘secularization’ in sociology and philosophy. It does not include a description of political systems and their approach to religion and secularity. The authors dwell on the classic secularization thesis and explain how this thesis was questioned in sociology and philosophy alike. The secularization debate nowadays counts many participants reflecting diverging normative positions. Despite this multitude of positions and nuances, the debate is likely to continue in the future along two particular strands: first, discussions on the use of concepts as secular/post-secular and the tenability of the religious/secular divide; second, discussions that will revolve around western modernity/multiple modernities, or ‘the West versus the rest’.