2004
Volume 117, Issue 3
  • ISSN: 0002-5275
  • E-ISSN: 2352-1244

Samenvatting

Abstract

There is a crisis in theoretical physics due to the lack of empirical data to verify unifying theories. The possible emergence of a non-empirical physics has led to a heated debate between proponents and opponents of this development. Initially, the debate was mainly attended by physicists, but now philosophers of science and historians of science are also joining the discussion. For example, historian of science Jeroen van Dongen, referring to Thomas Kuhn, argues that the debate is based on the question of what a good physicist is, the issue of correct values and identity. More and more scientists support a shift from empirical evidence to theoretical argumentation. According to van Dongen, this therefore involves a transition to a new paradigm: ‘meta’-physics. In my opinion, however, that is not yet the case, but more importantly, he also ignores the philosophical problems. I argue that the debate has reached a dead end because neither side has come up with a real solution to the crisis. According to Kuhn, a paradigm shift involves a new worldview, a relevant perspective that is lacking in the debate that is mainly about methodological issues.

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