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An unorthodox approach to Hegel’s philosophy of law. Legal approach to the Grundlinien, legal philosophical implications and legal applicability
The way in which Hegel’s Grundlinien can be related to legal concepts is rarely studied. Rather, among Hegelians, Hegel’s philosophy of law gives rise to discussion of the place of metaphysics, the systematics of his work, or the progressiveness of his ideas. In this paper, I will argue that it is possible to approach Hegel’s philosophy of law legally while retaining a philosophical core. This philosophical core only deviates from the ones in dominant Hegel interpretations. Before turning to the content of the alternative Hegel approach, I will first outline what constitutes a dominant and standard approach to Hegel’s philosophy of law. To do so, I will elaborate on Honneth’s analysis of Hegels Grundlinien (section 1). Then I will show that Hegels legal philosophical work is much more in tune with the legal doctrine than is usually attributed to him (section 2). Such a reading matters with regard to the dominant and standard notion of personhood that is derived from Hegels philosophy of law. This will be illustrated by discussing Benhabib’s Hegelian notion of personhood (section 3). Next, I will develop the way in which Hegel’s philosophy of law can be used as a starting point for a philosophical analysis of positive law, namely concerning the concept of personhood, social roles and the legal figure ‘the reasonable person.’ (Section 4). In this way, I show that we can only properly understand and fruitfully use Hegel’s philosophy of law if we have an eye for how legal concepts function in his work.