Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte - Volume 112, Issue 2, 2020

Resistance as ‘Counter-conduct’. On the Usefulness of Foucault’s concept of Contre-conduite

This paper intends to clarify the peculiarity of counter-conduct as a form of resistance and to examine its usefulness in our neoliberal era. In view thereof, it takes off with a general discussion of Foucault’s views of the relationship between power and resistance. Then the focus shifts more specifically to governmentality and its predecessor, pastoral power, as the specific type of power against which counter-conduct as a form of resistance is directed. This investigation allows in the next step to fathom the uniqueness of counter-conduct as a peculiar form of resistance and to find out whether it is appropriate to resist neoliberal governmentality. The paper concludes by pointing out a major weakness of counter-conduct, viz. its unlikelihood to develop into forms of collective resistance.

The force of inertia. A Sartrean perspective on resistance

Although Sartre’s philosophy of freedom is often considered as a philosophy of resistance, rooted in the experience of the Second World War, Sartre did not formulate a full-blown theory of resistance. However, his Critique of Dialectical Reason contains a wealth of material that allows a rethinking of the notion of resistance. In much of the literature, this notion is inflated so as to include action, opposition, struggle, exodus and a range of other phenomena. In order to acquire a sharper sense of the specific meaning of resistance, this paper argues, this notion has to be reconnected with its origins in mechanical physics. Sartre’s key concept of inertia provides a starting point for such a theoretical strategy. Although human beings are fundamentally free, they can live their relation to others and to themselves as if they were inert things. From a Sartrean perspective, resistance means making oneself inert in order to be able to persevere and to hold the line in the face of a threat. Resistance occurs at both sides of a struggle, and can take different, asymmetrical forms. The two fundamental modes of sociality Sartre distinguishes, namely the group and the series, offer different types of resistance to opponents.

The mise en scène of resistance against a global society. An analysis of (a)symmetrical distinctions

The concept of oikophobia is often used as an answer and rebuttal to the accusation of xenophobia that is often raised against nationalist groups. Oikophobia denounces the image of nationalists as people who first and foremost hate what is foreign or the foreigner. They describe themselves, on the contrary, as having a strong attachment to their own culture and their opponents as having a fear of or aversion to their origin or (cultural) home. This game of asymmetrical descriptions is the subject of this contribution, which focuses on the logic of distinctions that lies behind this resistance to (hostile) images. What then also lights up is that the global polarization we see between nationalist and cosmopolitan movements also concerns the status of asymmetrical distinctions themselves. The nationalist resistance to world society can be interpreted as a resistance to the becoming symmetrical of existential distinctions, i.e. distinctions that create identity and belonging.

‘Non-Fascist Living’: Identity, Subjectivity, Resistance

This article explores a recent form of academic and artistic resistance to contemporary modalities of fascism. This form of resistance is premised upon the argument that fascism lodges itself in the deepest recesses of the self, manifesting as fascist desires and beliefs. As such, traces of fascism are present in everyone, including people who do not otherwise hold fascistic ideas. This position goes on to argue that any critic of fascism must accordingly identify and eradicate such traces inside her own subjectivity, by means of an ethics of ‘non-fascist living’. Critically examining the philosophical presuppositions of this position, the article asks what implicit conception of the subject and its relation to resistance is at work here. It brings this position into conversation with Michel Foucault, upon whose work it draws but whose understanding of resistance, it is argued, it reconceptualises. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of this form of resistance for critical philosophical practice.

Resistance and Rights. Comparing Arendt, Foucault, and Young

The question if rights can be used in addressing gender-based oppression is at the center of recent debates in feminist theory. On the one hand, post-structuralist critiques have argued that differentiated rights, aimed at redressing injustices, reify the identity of oppressed groups (Brown 2000). On the other hand, proponents of differentiated rights have argued that these should be understood social-phenomenologically, as enabling social agents to counteract their oppression (Young 2011; McNay 2010). This paper argues in favor for the latter position while taking seriously the concern with regard to social identity articulated by the former. I do so by comparing Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault on the relation between resistance and rights. Starting from the observation that Arendt and Foucault agree on the need for a new law that can curtail the destructive dynamics of late-modernity, I argue that their account of resistance ascribes great importance to rights. Discussing the two authors in turn, I focus on two parallel themes. Firstly, confronted with the fight against anti-Semitic persecution (Arendt) and the struggle against governmental techniques (Foucault), they invoke rights against the near-total domination by late-modern states. Secondly, reflecting on how freedom practices require relationships with others in which one can develop one’s individual uniqueness, they hint towards rights that consolidate these relationships, of which friendship is the paradigmatic example. In conclusion, I return to the feminist debate on differential rights to show how Young’s model of communicative democracy is influenced by and is an instance of the relational rights that can be found in Arendt and Foucault.

Heidegger’s geophilosophy

In Heidegger’s ‘Black Notebooks’, his geophilosophy, the fact that he attributes a crucial importance to different places, becomes more evident than in his other works. The effect of this geophilosophy is that ontological difference – the key point of Heidegger’s thinking – is mixed up with, or replaced by, ontic differences. If in Being and Time Dasein’s ‘ground’ is an openness to Being, later this word often refers to Germany as a specific country. In 1939, just before the start of World War II, Hölderlin’s view of the relationship between ‘the own’ and ‘the foreign’ inspires Heidegger to see the possibility of a complementary relationship between the German and the Russian people. During and after World War II, Heidegger’s criticism of ‘Western’ metaphysics is strongly colored by his hostility to England, France and the U.S.A. In response to metaphysical universalism he relates different types of it to specific regions on earth. Remarkably, his criticism of metaphysics brings him to both support and criticize the notion of race.

Nietzsche versus Schmitt. Agonal versus political thinking

This article concerns the reception of Friedrich Nietzsche by Carl Schmitt with regard to the concept of the agon. In the 1933 edition of Der Begriff des Politischen Schmitt states that there is a ‘great metaphysical opposition’ (große metaphysische Gegensatz) between his political thinking and agonal thinking, the latter of which is associated with Nietzscheans like Alfred Baeumler and Ernst Jünger. It is argued that this metaphysical opposition is best explained in light of Schmitt’s intellectual development from decisionist to concrete order thinker. Moreover, it is argued that the reception of Nietzsche’s concept of the agon by Schmitt took place through Baeumler. Nietzsche’s concept of the agon is best described as a measured productive struggle between opponents who are approximately equal to each other. In the reception of Nietzsche’s concept of the agon a shift of focus occurs from a struggle between individuals to a struggle between collectives. At the same time the social character of the agon is lost, which was expressed in the thought that the individual could only develop his talents in a struggle with others.