Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte - Volume 116, Issue 1, 2024

Hyperpolitics and Political Commitment in the Twenty-First Century

What do the January 6^th invasion of the Capitol and the anti-racist demonstrations of mid-2020 have in common? Both birthed some of the largest protest movements in American history, but also diminished rapidly after their initial, pre-revolutionary peak. This article reads the recent political sequence through the concept of ‘hyperpolitics’. In contrast to previous types of post-politics or mass politics, ‘hyperpolitics’ stands for a distinctly novel mode of political commitment characteristic of the 2010s, in which a formerly apolitical public sphere finds itself intensely repoliticized, imposing itself on other domains such as the private, cultural, or economic. The return in question yet also runs across parameters that are more low-cost, low-entry, and low-duration than previous twentieth-century types, in stark contrast Max Weber’s typology of politics as the ‘slow boring of hard boards.’

What it means for conspiracy theories to become mainstream

In debates about conspiracy theories, it is often claimed that conspiracy thinking is on the rise or has even become mainstream. In this article, I want to explore this claim conceptually, and argue that there are at least three ways to interpret the claim that ‘conspiracy thinking has become mainstream’. First, there is the individual level, where it is a matter of counting heads. Mainstream then means that the majority believes in conspiracy theories. But there are two other levels. There is the institutional level, which is about whether conspiracy theories circulate within social institutions in an acceptable way. Is it acceptable to express conspiracy theories as a politician, scientist or journalist? Mainstream here means that dominant institutions in society view conspiracy thinking as an acceptable form of communication. Finally, there is the cultural level. Here the question is whether conspiracy thinking is a culturally acceptable way of speaking and thinking about society. Is it socially accepted as normal behavior, or is it rather a form of deviant behavior, accompanied by (informal) sanctions or demands for additional justification or proof? Mainstream here means that conspiracy thinking is seen as a normal way of speaking, without being accompanied by strange looks, shunning or the need to justify oneself as a conspiracy thinker. By making this distinction, we can think more clearly about whether conspiracy thinking is actually on the rise, and how we should deal with it.

The paradoxes of (in)tolerance in epistemic networks

Does the Capitol invasion of January 2021 teach us that intolerant viewpoints have no place in public debates? This view is defensible on the basis of Karl Popper’s paradox of tolerance, which states that too much tolerance will ultimately entail the demise of that very tolerance. But how are the limits of (in)tolerance to be determined? We argue that Popper’s purely epistemological interpretation of the concept of tolerance is untenable; determining such limits ultimately requires a political-normative interpretation. As an alternative epistemological perspective, we show how network epistemology can give us insight into how information, especially intolerant content, spreads through communities. This analysis can help us assess the consequences of potential interventions in public debates, and thus make informed choices.

Can well-informed citizens be engaged citizens?

The storming of the Capitol exposes a tension between different kinds of virtues in public life, at least if we can disregard – for the sake of argument – the morally and politically unacceptable excessive violence that accompanied it. If we think about the event as an example of a powerful protest based on deep convictions, it points to a tension between two kinds of civic virtues. A healthy political climate requires participation: engaged and motivated citizens who want to work for what they see as the common good. But in addition, reasoned argument and thinking well are also important: citizens who form their judgments carefully, are inquisitive, have an open mind, and appreciate and own the limits of their own knowledge and understanding. The context of a pluralistic liberal democracy with complex political issues causes tension between those two types of virtues. In an environment with fundamental differences of opinion and significant uncertainty, cognitive virtues often demand suspension of judgment and restraint in acting on the basis of uncertain beliefs. Participatory virtues, on the other hand, require action and commitment. I explore this tension and look for a solution that strikes a balance between these two kinds of virtues.

War of Ideas: On Feyerabend’s Epistemic Pluralism and the Polarising Effect of Alternative Truths

Paul Feyerabend is generally known as one of science’s greatest advocates of (epistemic) pluralism. Throughout his work, Feyerabend rejects the notion of a monistic epistemology and defends various forms of pluralism. Consequently, he is sometimes reproached for being responsible for the emergence of alternative truths – a radical form of pluralism – in the current post-truth era. This paper discusses the negative effects of alternative truths and the extent to which a solution for these effects is provided by Feyerabend’s theory of science. After narrowly defining alternative truths, it is concluded that alternative truths can have a polarising effect that may impede the progress of knowledge. At first glance, Feyerabend’s pluralistic theory does not acknowledge this downside of alternative truths. However, this paper argues that Feyerabend’s exclusion of cranks, as well as his (critical) view on reason, can be seen as possible limitations of his (epistemic) pluralism. The problem of alternative truths, therefore, is not necessarily an argument against Feyerabend’s theory of science.