Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis - Volume 123, Nummer 2, 2010

Modern descriptions of the medieval culture of violence usually lump together two distinct forms of private retaliation: taking blood revenge after a homicide and declaring war (or ‘a feud’) on one’s enemies because of grave injustice done. Without any doubt, this is partly due to the vague or ambiguous terminology in many medieval sources. Even so, in a legal context blood vengeance and feuding were meticulously kept apart, and treated differently. By observing this legal distinction we can get a better view of the attempts made by late medieval states, in different periods and along diverse tracks, to extend their monopoly of violence at the cost of more or less institutionalised forms of private violence. Around 1500, this process of containment was not anywhere near completion, but thanks to the gradual criminalisation of vengeance killings, feuding and other types of private warfare, a process that was supported by fundamental changes of mentality vis à vis family solidarity and the uncontrolled use of physical force, the end of a world in which people frequently ‘took the law into their own hands’, had come in sight.

Feuding has for a long time been a subject of considerable interest to historians and social scientists. Recent years have seen major developments in the field, especially in Germany. An indication of the importance of this area of study is not only the increasing number of publications and the variety of approaches, but also the fierce historiographical and ideological debate surrounding it. The present article reviews these developments. It analyses recent attempts to refute the nearly canonical interpretation of Otto Brunner, the ensuing debate, and the various explanations which have arisen. The survey ends with an examination of the latest direction in research on the feud, and with a sketch of a new explanatory framework by the author.

historians to view violence, revenge (as a human emotion), and honour as human universals out of which a cultural phenomenon such as feud has arisen in the past and will arise again repeatedly in the future. Various cultures in the past have tried to avert feuding by means of compensation for the original violent act, often involving payment of a certain amount of goods or money. Such practices were codified in texts which describe what was required in order to compensate each different type of injury. The article ends by drawing attention to a reconsideration of the nature-nurture debate within anthropology and the cognitive sciences. Since anthropology has been a discipline which many historians have turned to for inspiration in the past, it may be profitable to be aware of this development.

During the Late Middle Ages, faction formation in Flemish cities was largely determined by both international and local political and socio-economic relationships or oppositions and conflicts concerning honour and interests between rivalling elite networks. The ‘factions’ of the Flemish patricians often had a concentric pattern, with a core – usually closely interconnected by means of family ties – and a sympathising periphery, supporting the core for economic, political, or ideological reasons. The reasons why corporative middle groups supported factions are sometimes hard to fathom. The sources show that patrician factions often feared the middle classes and manual workers. These were able to punish newly elected leaders severely if they did not live up to their – sometimes great – expectations. The stakes of such conflicts were high, which probably explains their intensity as well as the increasingly frequent interventions by the state. Although the growing political influence of the Burgundian dynasty in the urban faction struggle in Flanders must be recognized, it can be disputed whether growing state power ensured less ‘private violence’. On the contrary, it seems that the Dukes often consciously ‘participated’ in faction struggles in order to reinforce sovereign power in the city.

During the late middle ages, public and private aspects of political life were interrelated; the boundaries between these two spheres were vague, and illdefined. However, notwithstanding this interrelatedness, contemporaries did make a distinction between the public and the private. For example, inhabitants of the duchy of Guelders considered their duchy as a political community with a public nature: Guelders was an independent unit, relatively autonomous from the rest of society. Aspects that were part of this public sphere were, among others, the office of the prince, the office of local functionaries, the ducal council, the mint, and revenues from tolls, levies, and taxes. The dynamic relations between private interests, functions, and values, and the nascent public domain form the background to the party strife raging in Guelders during the second half of the fourteenth century. Not only were the private interests of aristocrats and their families and supporters at stake in this party strife, but also the political community of Guelders itself. The growth of a public sphere on the one hand, and the interrelatedness of the public and the private on the other, fuelled party strife: private conflicts could become public, and, conversely, public problems could easily become private ones.

This contribution examines the function and use of violence by factions in the late-medieval city of Utrecht. In contrast to the existing perception that the power base of these groups consisted mainly of armed followers within the city, recruited on the basis of kinship, social networking, and patronage, this investigation into the violent outbreaks that occurred between 1400 and 1430 shows a slightly different picture. Firstly, faction leaders, whether operating from within the city or from outside (as exiles), were capable of organizing a fairly high level of private violence in order to remove the reigning faction from power. Secondly, those who participated in violent coups not only consisted of Utrecht residents, but also, and frequently, of non-residents. Although it is difficult to determine the exact numbers and nature of these followings, it can be established that participants were recruited on the basis of existing bonds with the faction leaders (with a role perhaps also for tenants on country estates), personal or collective grievances (e.g. within the guilds), or, not surprisingly, for financial reward. The readiness to use violence for political ends fits the violent feuding culture shared by different levels of society in large parts of Europe, but mainly within the aristocracy. It is argued that a comparison with feuding groups, factions, and armed retinues elsewhere might allow a better understanding of the composition and functioning of the late-medieval factions in Utrecht and the Low Countries as a whole.

Party strife between the Schieringers and Vetkopers in late-medieval Frisia west of the river Lauwers is poorly understood. This article initially follows the historiography on party strife in Frisia and then turns to modern discussions on feuding and power distribution in the same territory. It is suggested that we should look at the Frisian party strife between Schieringers and Vetkopers as a more public, more violent, and less local phenomenon than feuding. We should therefore dismiss some episodes that have in the past been described as party strife. In addition, early results from network-like studies show that the parties involved in party strife may have had a more constant character and may have been instrumental in the absence of party strife as well. What role ideology played in Frisian party strife remains an intriguing question.