Mens & Maatschappij - Volume 98, Issue 4, 2023

Noble burgomasters. The German occupation of the Netherlands as opportunity for the nobility to regain power?

The revision of the constitution in 1848 ended the constitutional role of the nobility. Their national political power declined from the end of the 19th century in line with the modernisation theory. Data collected on all burgomasters for 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940 confirm this trend at the local level: the percentage of municipalities with a noble burgomaster declined as well. Following Lammers’ sociological theory on occupation regimes, Dutch nobility could make use of the opportunities during the Nazi-German occupation to maintain or regain their power by taking up burgomasters’ positions. To avoid dismissal, the pre-war appointed burgomasters had to accept and implement measures imposed by the occupying forces. Our research shows that noble burgomasters were just as often dismissed as non-noble burgomasters. Also, noble burgomasters resigned as frequently as non-noble burgomasters in protest against the Nazi-German policies. Vacant burgomasters’ posts offered openings to obtain local power. Only eight of the about 550 newly appointed burgomasters during the occupation were a member of the nobility. Seven of them were a member of the National Socialist Movement (NSB) compared to about 337 newly appointed non-noble burgomasters. It looks like the German occupier failed in attracting the nobility to cooperate as burgomasters while the nobility wasn’t very keen in taking up these positions. Why weren’t there more noble burgomasters in power during the occupation years? Following Dronkers’ theory that during upheaval being of noble origin loses its significance, members of the nobility had to compete with pro-German NSB-members during the occupation years. Supporting Dronkers’ finding that the nobility used university education to regain power, the share of university graduates was twice as high among noble burgomasters in 1940.

Street harassment. So what? A quantitative study of the consequences of sexual street harassment of college students in Groningen

Sexual harassment in the street is a form of microaggression that takes many different forms, including whistling, hissing, yelling, insulting, asking for sex, chasing, or cornering. Sexual street harassment is a social problem. A material risk of using the public realm is that some may abuse it (e.g., groping a stranger in a crowded room). A moral risk is that some people may have a mistaken sense that they have a right to make comments about people who are conspicuous in public spaces. This article examines the consequences of sexual street harassment for college students (n = 280; 84.4% female; M age = 23). In this selective sample, female students were more likely to experience street harassment than male students. Victimization of street harassment was associated with lower psychological well-being, lower perceptions of safety, and more precautions to avoid harassment. Sexual street harassment may reduce the accessibility of public spaces for victims.

A longitudinal study of decreased trust during the corona pandemic

This study provides a longitudinal analysis of the strong decline in trust in the government in the Netherlands during the corona pandemic in 2020/2021. At the start of the pandemic, 69 per cent of the Dutch population had (much) trust in the government. One and a half year later this was declined to only 29 per cent. Using multilevel regression we studied individual level differences in both the level of trust and the degree of decline during the corona pandemic. We found various differences in the level of trust, particularly a strong effect of education: higher and intermediate educated people have more trust than lower educated respondents. All time varying variables also correlated with trust: the more people have troubles with making ends meet, have health problems and the higher their discontent with corona policies, the lower their trust in the government. Perceived threat by COVID increases trust in the government. Surprisingly, we found no individual differences in the decline of trust. Irrespective of their education, migration background or other characteristics, the decline in trust during the corona pandemic is more or less the same for all respondents. However, we found that the average development of trust is related with several time varying variables. There is a clear relation between the steep decline in trust and the growing discontent with corona policies. The decline in trust is also related to the perceived threat of the virus. Particularly in the later phase of the pandemic, both the perceived threat and the level of trust dropped. The average development of trust seemed not related to economic security and health problems during the pandemic. Although the perceived health remained rather constant during the pandemic and respondents experienced less problems with making ends meet, partly because the extensive economic support of the Dutch government, the level of trust in the government nevertheless fell.